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This paper considers the problem faced by long-term investors who have to delegate the manage-
ment of their money to professional fund managers. Investors can earn proﬁts if fund managers
collect long-term information. We investigate to what extent the delegation of fund manage-
ment prevents long-term information acquisition, inducing short-termism in ﬁnancial markets.
We also study the design of long-term fund managers’ compensation contracts. Under moral
hazard, fund managers’ compensation optimally depends on both short-term and long term fund
performance. Short term performance is determined by price eﬃciency, and thus by subsequent
fund managers’ information acquisition decisions. These managers are less likely to be active on
the market if information has already been acquired initially, giving rise to a feedback eﬀect. The
consequences are twofold: First, short-termism emerges. Second, short-term compensation for
fund managers depends in a non-monotonic way on long-term information precision. We derive
predictions regarding fund managers’ contracts and ﬁnancial markets eﬃciency.1 Introduction
Are short-term bonuses for fund managers harmful for market eﬃciency? Does short term
compensation prevent fund managers from taking into account the long term value of assets?
This paper explores these issues and investigates the link between the time structure of fund
managers mandates and market eﬃciency. Short-termism in ﬁnancial markets is hard to reconcile
with ﬁnance theory because of market eﬃciency: If short-term prices incorporate all available
future information, the fact that agents’ compensation is based on short-term prices cannot
induce a short-term bias. Presumably, the only reason why short-termism could arise is because
short-term prices are not eﬃcient. In this paper we endogenize the level of market eﬃciency, and
the corresponding fund managers’ compensation contracts.
A widespread view in the ﬁnancial industry is that relying on short term performance makes
it harder to implement a long term strategy. For instance, a Socially Responsible Investment
fund manager reports “The big diﬃculty is that a lot of the reputational issues and environmental
issues play out over a very long period of time [...] and if the market isn’t looking at it you can
sit there for a very long time on your high horse saying ‘this company is a disaster, it shouldn’t
be trusted ’and you can lose your investors an awful lot of money... ”.1 In a similar vein, to
convince investors that it will generate long term value, Brevan Howard Asset Management, one
of Europe’s largest hedge-fund groups, has started paying its traders’ annual bonuses over several
years, adjusting the size of the bonus according to the fund’s performance. The objective of this
paper is to explore the link between short-termism and short-term based compensation in the
asset management industry.
A growing body of literature shows that some pieces of information are slow to be incorpo-
rated into stock prices. For example, Edmans (2011) reports that ﬁrms included in the list of
"100 Best Companies to Work For in America" earn positive abnormal returns for a period of
time as long as four years after inclusion. Other studies suggest that positive abnormal long
run returns are triggered by high research and development expenditures (Lev and Sougiannis
(1996)), advertising expenditures (Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis (2001)), patent citations
(Deng, Lev, and Narin (1999)), software development costs (Aboody and Lev (1998)), corporate
governance quality indexes (Gompers, Ishii, Metrick (2003)). These empirical results are often
interpreted as stemming from the intangible nature of the information under study. The present
paper oﬀers an alternative hypothesis based on the long-term nature of the information under
study (the information items cited above are more likely to improve long-run than short-term
ﬁnancial performance). Our hypothesis is that the slow incorporation of information is a result
of stock market short-termism due to delegated asset management.
We consider the problem faced by long-term investors who have to delegate the management
1Guyatt (2006).
1of their money to professional fund managers. Investors can earn proﬁts if fund managers collect
long-term information. However, information acquisition is subject to moral hazard, in the sense
that fund managers have to exert an unobservable eﬀort to increase the level of precision of
their information. In this context, we determine the optimal compensation structure designed
by investors for their fund managers. Doing so, we are able to investigate to what extent
the delegation of fund management prevents long-term information acquisition, inducing short-
termism. We are also able to study if and how compensation based on short-term prices increases
short-termism.
More precisely, the model highlights two channels through which short-termism arises.
Firstly, because of moral hazard, investors have to give an agency rent to fund managers: this
increases the cost borne by investors to hire a fund manager. When that cost exceeds trading
proﬁts, short-termism emerges. In that case, an increase in information precision both increases
trading proﬁts and reduces the agency rent left to fund managers. For that reason, for some
parameter values, short-termism decreases with information precision. Secondly, agency issues
give rise to a feedback eﬀect that worsens short-termism. Under moral hazard, long term in-
vestors optimally spread fund managers’ compensation across the short run and the long run if
short-term prices are eﬃcient. However, whether short term prices are eﬃcient is endogenous. It
depends on whether subsequent fund managers acquire information, and trade according to it.
And this depends on the initial information acquisition decision of fund managers. Subsequent
fund managers are less likely to be present on the market if information has already been ac-
quired initially (this is the standard Grossman-Stiglitz (1980) mechanism). Therefore, incentive
costs increase if subsequent fund managers are deterred from entering the market. An interesting
result is that the higher the precision of the initial information, the stronger the feedback eﬀect
is. We conclude that there is a non-monotonic relationship between information precision and
short-termism. For instance, we identify cases where as information precision increases, investors
renounce to hire fund managers to trade on long-term information.
The model also delivers results regarding the structure of fund managers’ compensation
contracts. We show that it is optimal to give a bonus to fund managers each time the fund
performance is positive, and to keep this bonus constant, whatever the magnitude of the per-
formance, and the date at which positive performance arises. The basic reason why bonuses
are kept constant is that part of the positive performance is due to the presence (or not) of
hedgers on the market. When realized performance is due to market movements and not to
fund managers’ talent or eﬀort, it should not give rise to a bonus. Also, short term bonuses
are used to allow fund managers to smooth consumption across time, and to reduce incentive
costs. The optimal compensation contract can then be interpreted as an immediate cash bonus
when short term performance is positive, plus a deferred bonus if long term performance remains
positive. When short term performance is negative or null, fund managers only obtain a deferred
2bonus, conditional on long term performance. These results speak to the debate on the struc-
ture of managers’ bonus in the ﬁnancial service industry and are in line with the recently voted
European Union Capital Requirements Directive (CRD III). The latter explicitly sets limits to
bankers’ cash bonuses and speciﬁes that a substantial part of the bonus should be contingent on
subsequent performance. Our mix of cash and deferred, performance contingent bonuses oﬀers
theoretical ground for these practices.
The model allows us to derive predictions regarding market eﬃciency and fund managers’
bonus contracts. First, because there is a non-monotonic relationship between information pre-
cision and short-termism, we expect long term information to be more prevalent in markets or
industries where information precision is more ”extreme”, either low or high. A ﬁrst predic-
tion of the model is that prices are more likely to incorporate long-term information in very
well-known, or very innovative sectors, compared to standard industries. Relatedly, information
precision aﬀects the level of bonuses in the fund management industry in a non-monotonic way.
In particular, our model explains why bonuses do not necessarily decrease with information pre-
cision. This implies that fund managers’ bonuses are not always lower in industries where one
expects precise information to be more easily available. A second prediction of the model is that
short-termism should be more present when there is moral hazard between investors and fund
managers. The implication of this is that in markets where delegated portfolio management is
more important, prices should incorporate less long-term information, compared to markets with
more proprietary trading. This prediction relies on the presumption that moral hazard problems
are more easily circumvented in proprietary trading. Last, because short-termism is related to
price eﬃciency through the feedback eﬀect, an implication of the model is that short-termism is
more present when markets are less liquid. Indeed, in illiquid markets, future informed traders’
demand is more easily spotted and incorporated into prices, which discourages their entry. An-
ticipating this, initial investors do not enter either. The model thus predicts that long term
information should be more reﬂected into prices in developed markets compared to less liquid
emerging markets. Likewise, we would expect to see more long-term compensation for managers
of long-term-oriented funds who invest in emerging markets. For instance, pension fund man-
agers or socially responsible fund managers should receive more long term compensation when
they invest in emerging markets.
Our analysis is related to the literature that determines how frictions on the market can
prevent investors from trading on long-term information. If investors are impatient, Dow and
Gorton (1994) show that they may renounce to acquire long-term information, because they
are not sure that a future trader will be present when they have to liquidate their position. In
Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1992), short-term traders herd on the same (potentially useless)
information because they care only about short-term prices. Shleifer and Vishny (1990) also
base short-termism on the reason that arbitrage in in the long-run is (exogenously) more costly
3than in the short-run. Holden and Subrahmanyam (1996) argue that risk averse investors do
not like to hold positions for a long time when prices are volatile. And Vives (1995) considers
that the rate of information arrival matters when traders have short horizons. In all of these
papers, investors have exogenous limited horizon, or are risk averse and cannot contract with risk
neutral agents. Having in mind the situation faced by long-term investors such as pension funds,
we take a diﬀerent road, and assume that investors are long-term and risk neutral. This allows
us to study explicitly the delegation problem with fund managers. Guembel (2005) also studies
a problem of delegation, where investors need to assess the ability of fund managers. Short-
termism arises in his model because trading on short-term information, albeit less eﬃcient, gives
a more precise signal on fund managers’ ability. We depart from this analysis by assuming moral
hazard instead of unknown fund managers’ talent. Last, our focus on the moral hazard problem
between investors and fund managers is related to Gorton, He, and Huang (2009). They explore
to what extent investors can use information aggregated in current market prices to incentive fund
managers, and highlight that competing fund managers may have an incentive to manipulate
prices, rendering markets less eﬃcient. Instead, we focus on how investors can use future prices
to incentives their managers: we thus ignore manipulation, but highlight a feedback eﬀect that
also decreases price eﬃciency.
The paper is organized as follows. Next section presents the model and determines the
benchmark case when there is no moral hazard. Section 3 derives the main results of the paper:
it solves the problem under moral hazard, and highlights the cost of delegation, and the optimal
time structure of fund managers’ mandates. Section 4 presents the predictions derived from the
model. Last, section 5 discusses the robustness of the analysis by exploring to what extent results
are aﬀected when some assumptions are relaxed.
2 The model
We consider an exchange economy with two assets: a risk-free asset with a rate of return nor-
malized to zero, and a risky asset. There are three dates: 1, 2, and 3. The risky asset pays oﬀ
a cash-ﬂow v at date 3. For simplicity, the cash-ﬂow can be 1 or 0 with the same probability 1
2.
Trading occurs at date t with t 2 f1;2g.
2.1 The fund management industry
There are two types of agents in the fund management industry: investors and fund managers.
Investors are risk-neutral. We assume that, because of time or skill constraints, investors cannot
access the ﬁnancial market directly. They have to hire a fund manager, referred to as a manager.
We assume that one investor is born at each date t and delegates her fund management to a
4manager.2 We consider that a diﬀerent manager is hired at each date. Investor 1 is born at date
1 and hires manager 1, and investor 2 is born at date 2 and hires manager 2.
Managers are risk averse and have no initial wealth. The utility function of manager 1
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A manager hired at date t receives a binary private signal (H or L) about the ﬁnal cash ﬂow
distributed by the risky asset. The precision of the signal depends on the level of eﬀort exerted
by the manager. There are two possible levels of eﬀort denoted by ne or e. Speciﬁcally, if the
manager exerts no eﬀort (ne), the signal is uninformative:
Pr
ne (st = Hjv = 1) = Pr
ne (st = Hjv = 0) = Pr
ne (st = Ljv = 1) = Pr
ne (st = Ljv = 0) =
1
2
If manager t exerts eﬀort (e), he incurs a private cost c. The precision of the signal in this case
is denoted 't. We have:
Pr
e (st = Hjv = 1) = Pr
e (st = Ljv = 0) = 't, and
Pr
e
(st = Ljv = 1) = Pr
e
(st = Hjv = 0) = 1   't:
To reﬂect the fact that eﬀort improves signal informativeness about v, we have that 't > 1
2. For
simplicity, we further assume that '2 = 1, that is, the manager at date 2 gets a perfect signal
when he exerts eﬀort. We denote '1 = '. We assume that signals are independent across time
(conditional on v).
2The assumption that only one investor is born at each date is made for simplicity. As will be discussed later,
our main results hold with several investors.
3Because fund managers have no wealth, transfers R cannot be negative.
52.2 The ﬁnancial market
Our ﬁnancial market is modelled after Dow and Gorton (1994). Managers interact with two
types of agents: hedgers and market makers. At each trading date t, a continuum of hedgers (of
mass 1) enters the market with probability 1
2. At date 3, those hedgers receive an income of 0 or
1 that is perfectly negatively correlated with the risky asset cash ﬂow. For simplicity, we assume
that hedgers are inﬁnitely risk averse. They are thus willing to hedge their position by buying
qh
t = 1 unit of the risky asset.4
Market makers are risk neutral. They compete à la Bertrand to trade the risky asset, and
are present in the market from date 1 to date 3.
At each date t, trading proceeds as follows. If hired at date t, a manager submits a market
order denoted by qm
t . If born at date t, hedgers demand qh
t = 1. Market makers observe the
aggregate buy and sell orders separately, and execute the net order ﬂow out of their inventory.
Denote by qt, the aggregate buy orders. Bertrand competition between market makers along
with the risk neutrality assumption implies that prices for the risky asset equal the conditional
expectation of the ﬁnal cash ﬂow:
P1 = E (vjq1),
and P2 = E (vjq1;q2):
The timing of our model is summarized in Figure 1. Let us now study how managers’ demands
are formed. Since hedgers never sell, market makers directly identify a sell order as coming
from a manager. Any information that the manager has would then directly be incorporated
into prices. As a result, informed managers do not ﬁnd it strictly proﬁtable to sell the asset.
For the same reason, managers who want to buy submit a market order qm
t = qh
t = 1, that is,
they restrict the size of their order to reduce their market impact. Consequently, equilibrium
candidates are such that managers, when they are informed, demand either one or zero.
When a manager is hired at date t, the potential buying order ﬂow is thus qt = 0, qt = 1, or
qt = 2. When qt = 0, market makers infer that the manager does not want to buy the risky asset.
Likewise, when qt = 2, market makers understand that the manager submits an order to buy.
On the contrary, when qt = 1, market makers do not know if the order comes from the hedgers
or from the manager. As an illustration, Figure 2 displays the price path when both managers
exert eﬀort, buy after receiving a high signal, and do not buy after receiving a low signal, and
when prices are set accordingly.
4In general, if they are not inﬁnitely risk averse, hedgers want to trade less than 1 unit of the asset. However,
as shown by Dow and Gorton (1994), as long as they are suﬃciently risk averse, hedgers want to trade a positive
amount qh. All our results hold if qh < 1. In particular, the same conclusions hold if hedgers income is positively
correlated with the cash ﬂow, in which case they sell the asset to cover the risk.
6Consider now that a manager is not hired at date t. In this case, the potential order ﬂow
is qt = 0 or qt = 1 depending on hedgers’ demand. Also, market makers anticipate that only
hedgers are potentially trading and the order ﬂow is uninformative.
2.3 The fund management delegation contracts: the perfect information
benchmark
Because they cannot access ﬁnancial markets directly, investors hire investment managers. This
delegation relationship is organized thanks to contractual arrangements. A management contract




3 for manager 1 at each date 1, 2 and 3, respectively, and R2
2 and R2
3 for manager
2 at each date 2 and 3, respectively.
This section studies the information acquisition and investment decisions when investors can
contract on the level of eﬀort and on the signal received. This benchmark is useful to interpret the
results in the next section in which managers’ eﬀort as well as the signal received are unobservable.
In this benchmark, we consider the following equilibrium conjecture: investors hire managers;
managers exert eﬀort and trade qm
t = 1 after receiving good news only. In addition, the ﬁrst
manager trades once to open his position, and holds his portfolio up to date 3.5
This benchmark calls for two comments. First, from investors’ perspective, adequate use
of information prescribes that managers invest after receiving a high signal and do nothing
otherwise. Indeed, if managers were investing irrespective of the realization of the signal, investors
would be better oﬀ saving the cost of information acquisition. Second, we discuss in section 5 the
case in which the ﬁrst manager trades at date 2, and argue that this cannot be an equilibrium
strategy.
To ensure managers’ participation, investors propose a compensation contract that gives
managers a utility c when eﬀort e is chosen and when managers invest appropriately.6 It is
straightforward to show that the investor proposes manager 1 transfers R1
1 = R1
2 = R1
3 = U 1  c
3

such that his expected utility is equal to c. In this case, it is individually rational for the manager
to accept the contract. Similarly, manager 2 obtains transfers R2
2 = R2




expected utility is c.
Investors oﬀer such a contract if their expected proﬁt is larger than the cost of information
acquisition. Let us consider ﬁrst the investor at date 1. Her expected proﬁt is equal to the
expected cash-ﬂow paid by the asset minus the expected price paid to acquire the asset, minus
5We associate to this equilibrium conjecture the following out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Upon observing qt > 1,
market makers believe that eﬀort has been exerted and st = H has been observed. Upon observing qt < 1, market
makers believe that eﬀort has been exerted and st = L has been observed.
6We assume that managers’ reservation utility is zero.








. Market makers anticipate that
manager 1 exerts eﬀort and buys after a high signal. As illustrated in Figure 2, the distribution
of the order ﬂow is as follows: q1 = 2 with probability 1
4 (this event corresponds to the case in
which the signal is H and in which hedgers enter), q1 = 1 with probability 1
2, or q1 = 0 with
probability 1
4. Equilibrium prices in each case are P1 = E (vjq1 = 2) = ', P1 = E (vjq1 = 1) = 1
2,
P1 = E (vjq1 = 0) = 1   '.
The net expected proﬁt of investor 1 is written:



































If manager 1’s eﬀort and signal can be contracted upon, investor 1 decides to hire a fund manager
if and only if:









Let us consider next the investor at date 2. Her net expected proﬁt is written:














is manager 2’s expected compensation. Given that manager 2’s
signal is perfect, prices set by market makers according to the observed order ﬂow are:
P2(P1;q2 = 2) = 1
P2(P1;q2 = 1) = P1
P2(P1;q2 = 0) = 0
Note that Pr(s2 = HjP1) = Pr(v = 1jP1) = P1 and E (P2jP1;s2 = H) = 1











































At equilibrium, investor 1’s proﬁt increases with manager 1’s information precision ('). This
precision has to be high enough for investor to recoup the cost of information acquisition. Also,
8investor 2’s proﬁt depends on investor 1’s decision: when prices incorporate manager 1’s infor-
mation, the proﬁt that investor 2 can obtain is reduced. This eﬀect is stronger the more precise
manager 1’s information is (see, for example, Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). These are standard
eﬀects of trading under asymmetric information. In addition, investor 1’s equilibrium proﬁt does
not depend on investor 2’s decision. This is because i) investor 1 holds her portfolio until date
3 when dividends are realized, and ii) manager 1’s compensation does not depend on interim
prices.
3 Fund management contract at date 1
We now investigate the case in which, at date 1, the investor cannot observe whether her manager
has exerted eﬀort nor what signal was obtained. There is thus moral hazard at the information
acquisition stage and asymmetric information at the trading decision stage.7 We do consider
however that the fund management contract can be contingent on manager’s trading positions.
The contract is designed to provide the manager with the incentives to appropriately exert eﬀort
and trade, taking into account that he acts in his own best interest. Fund management contracts
thus include two types of incentive constraints: one type is dedicated to the eﬀort problem while
the other is dedicated to the signal and trading problem.
In order to provide adequate incentives, investor 1 bases transfers on the trading position
opened by her manager (qm
1 ) and on the diﬀerent prices that are realized at each date. Hence,










. P1 is included in
the contract proposed to manager 1 because investor 1 uses the information content of P2 relative
to P1 to provide incentives.
We are looking for delegation contracts that provide managers incentive to exert eﬀort and to
invest only when they receive a good signal.8 Contracts have thus to fulﬁll several conditions that
are explicitly given below: the incentive compatibility constraints ensuring that managers are
trading appropriately given that they exert eﬀort (constraints ICH and ICL), and the incentive
compatibility constraint ensuring that managers are exerting eﬀort (constraint ICe). Also, to
write these constraints, we need to know what managers do when they are not exerting eﬀort.
There are two possibilities. Under constraint H1, managers prefer to invest rather than not to
invest. Under constraint H0, managers prefer not to invest. To derive the optimal contract, we
work with H1. We then show that the results are the same if we impose constraint H0 instead
7The assumption of asymmetric information is imposed to capture some realistic features of the asset man-
agement industry. However, from a theoretical point of view, we show later that it does not induce an additional
incentive cost compared to the moral hazard problem.
8As discussed in the previous section, there is no equilibrium (even without moral hazard) where investor 1
ﬁnds it proﬁtable to trade at date 2. Besides, it is straightforward to see that there is no equilibrium where
managers buy after a low signal and do not trade after a good signal, or where trading is independent of signals.
9of H1.
3.1 Characterization of the optimal fund management contract
Assume for now that investors can contract on managers’ consumption at each date, that is,
there are no private savings. In our framework managers’ ability to privately save would not
aﬀect the optimal contract. We discuss this point in section 3.3 in which we investigate the time



























































Since the manager’s compensation depends on the random variables P1, P2, and v, Ee (:) refers
to the expectation operator that uses the distribution of these variables under eﬀort conditional
on the signal received and the trading decision. These distributions are presented in Figure 2 for
the case in which manager 1 plays the equilibrium strategy. When the manager deviates, prices
are set according to market makers’ equilibrium beliefs but the distribution of random variables is
aﬀected by the deviation. For instance, if manager 1 does not trade after s1 = H, the probability











indicates that, upon exerting eﬀort and receiving a low signal, manager 1
prefers doing nothing than buying.















































This constraint indicates that manager 1’s expected utility has to be greater when he exerts
eﬀort and trades appropriately (left handside of the inequality) than when he exerts no eﬀort
and always invests (right handside of the inequality). In order to write down this constraint, we
work under the assumption that the manager always prefers to invest when he does not exert




























Investor 1 knows that, in order to induce her manager to exert eﬀort and trade appropriately,
these four constraints need to be satisﬁed (along with the positive compensation constraint).
Given that they are indeed satisﬁed, she chooses the transfers that maximize her expected proﬁt
expressed as follows:
E (1) = Pr









As in the benchmark, Investor 1’s expected proﬁt depends on the expected dividend, the ex-
pected purchase price of the asset, and the expected managerial compensation. Given the above
program, the expected compensation of the fund manager has the following properties.


































and all other transfers are null.
The optimal contract has to provide two types of incentives. First, it must induce the manager
to exert eﬀort and to gather useful information. Second, it must induce the manager to trade
appropriately according to this information. Both incentive problems can be addressed together.
To be induced to exert eﬀort, the fund manager has to be rewarded in those states that are
informative of his eﬀort. For example, when the manager exerts eﬀort, it is more likely to get
the high dividend v = 1 after a good signal. As reﬂected in Proposition 1, rewarding the fund
manager when he buys (qm
1 = 1) and the ﬁnal dividend is v = 1 provides adequate incentives to
exert eﬀort and trade appropriately. Similarly, when the interim price P2 contains information
on the dividend, it is potentially optimal to use it as a compensation basis: the manager is thus
rewarded when he buys and the interim price is P2 = 1. The same arguments apply for the
case where the manager receives a low signal and is induced not to trade (qm
1 = 0). He is then
rewarded when the ﬁnal dividend is low (v = 0) and/or the interim price is low (P2 = 0). In the
remainder of the paper, we refer to those states as the incentive compatible states. Proposition
1 also indicates that transfers in all other states of nature are zero. This can happen for two
11reasons. First, some states of nature provide no information about manager’s eﬀort. This is,
for example, the case when the interim price provides no additional information compared to
the initial price (P2 = P1). Second, in some so-called adverse states of nature, the non-negative
compensation constraint is binding. This is the case when the state of nature reveals negative
information regarding manager’s eﬀort (e.g., when qm
1 = 1 and v = 0). If negative payments could
be imposed, the manager would optimally be punished with a negative utility. The assumption
that the fund manager is cash-poor simply puts a lower bound on investor’s ability to punish
the fund manager. If the fund manager had some initial wealth, it would then be optimal to ask
him to pledge some collateral that could be seized by the investor in adverse states. This would
provide higher-powered incentives to the fund manager.
Manager’s expected utility under moral hazard is greater than when investors can contract
on the level of eﬀort. This is stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Manager 1’s agency rent is equal to c
2' 1.
The rent depends positively on the cost of eﬀort c and negatively on the informativeness of
the signal '. The term 2'   1 reﬂects the increase in the probability of being rewarded when
the manager exerts eﬀort compared to the case in which he does not exert eﬀort.
We now investigate further the role of the interim price P2 in the provision of incentives
to manager 1. Proposition 1 indicates that P2 is potentially useful when it reveals additional
information on the ﬁnal dividend value.9 A natural question is when the investor ﬁnds it useful
to base the contract on the interim price or on the ﬁnal dividend. When P2 is informative, it
perfectly reveals the ﬁnal dividend: both are thus equivalent from an incentive point of view (see
Holmstrom, 1979). However, the investor may ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to pay at both dates in order
to smooth manager’s consumption as is studied below. Because of manager’s risk aversion, this
minimizes the cost of fund manager’s compensation borne by the investor.
3.2 Cost of delegation
The previous section determines what rent has to be left to the manager in order to provide
incentives. We now study what is the cost for the investor to oﬀer such a rent, that is, the
optimal expected bonus. The optimal contract depends on the level of eﬃciency of the interim
price. Investor 1 has thus to anticipate investor 2’s equilibrium behavior. Price P2 is informative
only if manager 2 is trading on valuable information, that is, if he is actually oﬀered an incentive
contract by investor 2. We assume at this stage that investor 2 enters the market if the price P1
9Recall that, in our model, P2 contains additional information when it is equal to 1 or 0, and is uninformative
when it is equal to P1.




where this interval is symmetric around 1
2. For example,
the previous section shows that, without moral hazard at date 2,  = 
FB
and  = FB.10 We
have two cases to consider: when '  , investor 2 hires a fund manager for all realizations of
the price P1. When ' > , investor 2 hires a fund manager only if the initial price contains no
information, that is, if price P1 = 1
2. The next proposition investigates how the cost of delegation
varies with the level of '.





















































Proposition 2 shows that the expected bonus function changes when '   and when ' > .
This reﬂects the fact that when '  , the price P2 is more eﬃcient because manager 2 is always
hired. Manager 2 trades on his information for any level of the price P1. In turn, states of
the world informative about manager 1’s eﬀort occur more frequently. The investor uses these
incentive compatible states to design the incentive contract. This enables her to better trade oﬀ
consumption smoothing and incentive provision. As shown in property i), the expected bonus










when ' moves above . Property ii) further shows
that, except at ' = , the expected bonus decreases with '. This is because, when information
is more precise, incentive compatible states are more suggestive of a high eﬀort.
The investor compares this expected bonus to the expected gross trading proﬁts in order to
determine whether she wants to hire a manager. The hiring decisions are stated in the following
corollary which illustrates the impact of moral hazard on long-term information acquisition.
Corollary 2 When '  , investor 1 hires a fund manager (and long-term information is
acquired) if and only if ' > ' > 'FB. When ' > , investor 1 hires a fund manager (and
long-term information is acquired) if and only if ' > ' > '.
This corollary shows that moral hazard creates short-termism, in the sense that long-term
information is not acquired while it would be under perfect information. Figure 3 illustrates the
10Using the methodology developed in the appendix, one can easily derive these bounds when there is moral
hazard between investor 2 and her fund manager.
13main ﬁndings of the corollary. Short-termism arises because of two eﬀects. The direct eﬀect of
moral hazard is that it increases the cost of information acquisition (the manager earns a rent).
In turn, investor 1 requires higher trading proﬁts to hire a fund manager. To increase proﬁts, she
thus requires higher information precision (' > 'FB). There is also an indirect eﬀect of moral
hazard. The cost of incentive provision borne by investor 1 depends on the informed trading
activity of manager 2. In particular, the presence of manager 2 creates a positive externality
for investor 1 in the sense that it reduces the expected bonus and therefore the threshold above
which information is acquired (' < '). This eﬀect is not present in the perfect information
benchmark: investor 1’s decision is independent from manager 2’s behavior because manager 1
can be paid in any state of nature (regardless of price P2 informational eﬃciency).
A natural question is whether increasing information precision always reduces short-termism.
This is not necessarily the case in our model, because of the externality of manager 2’s trading.
As shown in proposition 2, information precision has an ambiguous impact on the expected
bonus. On the one hand, the expected bonus functions decrease with '. On the other hand,
the expected bonus jumps upward at ' = . It is thus conceivable that increasing ' prevents
investor 1 from hiring a manager. This is actually the case when ' <  < ' (see Panels B
and C), but not when ' < ' <  (see Panel A). When ' <  < ' < 1 (Panel B), investor
1 hires a manager when '  '   but not when   ' < '. In Panel C, ' > 1, short-
termism is extreme: when ' > , the fund manager is never hired and no long term information
is acquired.
These results complement the analysis of Dow and Gorton (1994) that suggests that the
arbitrage chain which induces long-term information to be incorporated in prices, might break.
Our model highlights that the arbitrage chain might break because of a feedback eﬀect across
successive managers’ contracts. Investor 1 needs investor 2 to provide incentive to her manager,
but if she does so, investor 2 does not (always) hire a fund manager. In turn, this can discourage
investor 1 to oﬀer an incentive contract, and no long-term information is incorporated into prices.
3.3 The structure of fund managers’ compensation
We now explore how fund managers’ compensation varies with the fund performance, and is
structured over time. We deﬁne short term performance as the return (21 1qm
1 =1 1)(P2 P1) and
long term performance as (21 1qm
1 =1 1)(v P1). The dummy 1 1qm
1 =1 equals one if manager 1 buys
one unit of asset, and zero otherwise. Performance is relative to the riskfree return (normalized
to zero), which is the appropriate benchmark for risk neutral investors. Recall from Proposition
1 that manager 1 is optimally rewarded if he trades and the interim price (or the ﬁnal cash-ﬂow)
is 1. If he does not trade, he is rewarded when the interim price (or the ﬁnal cash-ﬂow) is 0. The
next proposition illustrates how the fund manager’s compensation varies with fund performance.
14Proposition 3 The manager is awarded the same bonus after any positive short-term or long
term performance.
Proposition 3 states that the fund manager’s bonus remains constant whatever the level of
the portfolio performance, and whatever the time at which positive performance materializes.
Firstly, as long as performance is positive, the level of portfolio performance does no aﬀect the
bonus because it is beyond manager 1’s control. Indeed, portfolio performance is not very high if
manager 1’s information is incorporated into the initial trading price P1, that is if hedgers trade
in the same direction as the manager. Portfolio performance is higher when manager 1’s trade
is not revealed into price P1. Since price P1 eﬃciency depends on hedgers’ demands, manager 1
should not be punished or rewarded according to the magnitude of positive performance. Our
model thus provides a setting in which caps on managers’ compensation naturally arise.
Secondly, all incentive compatible states (at date 2 or 3) are equally informative about man-
agerial eﬀort. Therefore the same bonus is oﬀered whether positive performance accrues in the
short term or in the long term. One can interpret the optimal contract as follows. When short
term performance is positive, manager 1 receives an immediate cash bonus, plus a deferred bonus
if long term performance remains positive. When short term performance is negative or null,
manager 1 only receives the deferred bonus, conditional on long term performance. Thus, con-
sumption smoothing and incentive issues combine to give rise to cash and deferred performance
sensitive bonuses.
Our results on the compensation contract structure would be the same if manager 1 could
privately save. When manager 1 receives a bonus at date 2, he knows that he will receive the
same bonus with probability 1 at date 3: marginal utilities are equal across dates, and there
is no incentive to save to smooth consumption. In a more general model in which incentive
compatible states (at date 2 or 3) are not equally informative about managerial eﬀort, the bonus
size would vary with states’ informativeness (but not with the level of eﬃciency of price P1).
In that case, the possibility of private savings would introduce an additional constraint to the
optimal contract reﬂecting the fact that marginal utilities should be equal across states.
The results of Proposition 3 speak to the debate on the structure of managers’ bonus in the
ﬁnancial service industry. The recently voted European Union Capital Requirements Directive
(CRD III) explicitly sets limits to bankers’ cash bonuses. In our model, we show that bonuses
are capped to reﬂect the idea that some of the realized performance is due to market movements
rather than managerial talent or eﬀort. CRD III also speciﬁes that a substantial part of the bonus
should be contingent on subsequent performance. Our mix of cash and deferred, performance
contingent bonuses oﬀers theoretical ground for these new regulatory practices.
The next proposition explores to what extent the compensation contract is based on long-term
or short-term performance.
15Proposition 4 The proportion of long-term expected compensation is higher when '   than
when ' < .
Proposition 4 states that the time structure of manager 1’s mandate depends on date 2 price
eﬃciency. The proportion of long-term expected compensation depends on the proportion of
incentive compatible states available at dates 2 and 3. When '  , less information is acquired
by manager 2, and less incentive compatible states are available. Investor 1’s optimal response
is to increase the proportion of long term bonuses.
In our model, the only reason why time structure of mandates matters relies on the consump-
tion smoothing-incentive trade-oﬀ. Relaxing some assumptions of the model provides additional
insights on the optimal compensation timing. Suppose ﬁrst that manager 1 exhibits impatience
in the sense that for a given level of consumption, he prefers to consume at date 2 than at date 3.
This necessarily shifts his compensation towards more short-term bonus. Suppose alternatively
that the precision of manager 2’s information is not perfect. The ﬁnal cash-ﬂow v is then a suﬃ-
cient statistic of manager 1’s eﬀort. This shifts his compensation towards more long-term bonus.
The optimal time structure thus trades-oﬀ the beneﬁt of short-term compensation to cope with
manager 1’s impatience, and the beneﬁt of long-term compensation to improve incentives.
Note however that risk aversion is a necessary condition for a mix of long term and short
term compensation to arise. Were manager 1 risk neutral, one incentive compatible state would
suﬃce. The optimal compensation scheme could entail payment at date 2 or at date 3 only and
the feed back eﬀect across managers’ contracts would not be present.
4 Empirical implications
The results presented above allow us to derive a number of empirical implications according to
the level of information precision, the extent of moral hazard, and the level of market liquidity.
First, there is a non-monotonic relationship between long-term information acquisition and
information precision ' because the incentive cost of long term information acquisition jumps
when ' crosses the threshold . We thus expect long term information to be more prevalent
in markets or industries where information precision is more ”extreme”, either low and high. A
ﬁrst prediction of the model is that prices are more likely to incorporate long-term information
in very well-known, or very innovative sectors, compared to standard industries.
Relatedly, information precision aﬀects the level of bonuses in the fund management industry
in a non-monotonic way. In particular, our model explains why bonuses do not necessarily
decrease with information precision. This implies that fund managers’ bonuses are not always
lower in industries where one expects precise information to be more easily available. However,
16the model predicts that the proportion of long-term bonus should be higher.
Second, an insight of the paper is that moral hazard creates short-termism. A natural impli-
cation of this is that short-termism should be more pregnant in markets where delegated portfolio
management has a larger market share. In particular, prices should incorporate more long-term
information when there is more proprietary trading, to the extent that moral hazard problems
are more easily circumvented in proprietary trading.
The fact that there is more short-termism does not a priory imply that prices are less eﬃcient
at all dates: when long term information acquisition is precluded, prices are less eﬃcient at date
1, but this can increase informed trading at date 2. If information precision increases with time,
this implies that overall market eﬃciency might increase with short-termism. However, it is
easy to see that this is not true in our model. Indeed short-termism enhances future informed
trading when ' is rather large. This is the case in which information precision does not increase
much with time.We thus expect price eﬃciency to be negatively correlated with the prevalence
of delegated portfolio management.
Third, the results of our model enable us to study the impact of market liquidity on the
production of long term information. In the model, short-termism is related to the existence
of a feedback eﬀect between successive managers’ contracts. This feedback eﬀect is aﬀected by
market liquidity. When markets are very illiquid (e.g. when hedgers are less likely to be present
on the market), informed traders are easily spotted, which annihilates their potential proﬁts. If
information is costly, illiquid markets deter information acquisition. If investors anticipate at
date 1 that market liquidity will deteriorate, they refrain from inducing long term information
acquisition, thereby worsening short-termism. An implication of the model is that short-termism
is more present when markets are less liquid. To test this prediction, on could study whether
long term information is more reﬂected into prices in developed markets compared to less liquid
emerging markets. Likewise, we would expect to see more long-term compensation for managers
who invest in emerging markets. For instance, pension fund managers or socially responsible fund
managers should receive more long term compensation when they invest in emerging markets,
compared to more liquid markets.
5 Robustness
This section explores the robustness of the main assumptions of the model.
First, there is only one pair investor/manager per period. If this was not the case, our results
would still hold as long as there is imperfect competition and thus non-null trading proﬁts. Note
however that in this case, investors can use the current price to extract information on the eﬀort
made by her manager (see Gorton, He, and Huang 2009).
17Second, agents are long-lived. If agents were short-lived, we would be back to Dow and
Gorton (1994) that show that asymmetric information might not be incorporated into asset
prices despite the existence of a chain of successive traders.
Third, investors cannot coordinate their investment policies. In our setting coordination
would be useful for investor 1 to compensate investor 2 when ' > , in order to avoid a sharp
increase in the expected transfer.
Fourth, manager 1 cannot buy again at date 2 after buying at date 1. This assumption
does not aﬀect our results. Indeed, if price P1 reveals manager 1’s information, there is no
expected proﬁt left for him. If P1 = 1
2, he anticipates that, if v = 1, manager 2 knows it and
buys. Therefore, the total demand if manager 1 buys again is 2 or 3. The market maker thus
infers that there has been at least one high signal and sets a price strictly greater than ' which
eliminates any expected proﬁt for manager 1. When v = 0, manager 2 knows it and does not
buy. If manager 1 buys again at date 2, the total demand is either 1 or 2. When the demand
is 2, the price is greater than ' for the reason explained above. When the demand is 1, market
maker is not aware of the fact that v = 0, the price is strictly greater than 0 and manager 1 loses
money (he would be subject to the winner’s curse). Overall, at equilibrium, manager 1 cannot
trade twice on a high signal.
Fifth, market makers observe buying and selling order ﬂows separately. If this was not the
case, managers at equilibrium would not buy after a high signal and sell after a low signal.
Indeed, their trading would always be identiﬁed and prices would be fully revealing. No proﬁt
could ever be made. The equilibrium strategies would be either to refrain from selling after a low
signal (as it is the case in our equilibrium) or to refrain from buying after a high signal (our logic
would still hold in this case). This assumption is simply helpful to focus on one equilibrium.
18Appendix
Proof of proposition 1




















deﬁned in section 3.1 page 10. Recall that the optimal contract de-











cording to the price path. To characterize the optimal contract we use a standard Lagrangian technique.
Assume ﬁrst that '  . The investor’s program is:
min


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































: (:)  0:
We denote by 1
1 (qm) the Lagrange multiplier of the constraint R1
1 (qm)  0, by 1
2 (qm;P1;P2) the
Lagrange multiplier of the constraint R1
2 (qm;P1;P2)  0, and by 1
3 (qm;P1;P2;v) the Lagrange multiplier
of the constraint R1
3 (qm;P1;P2;v)  0. Similarly 1

























Assume ﬁrst that the optimal contract entails R1
2 (1;';1) > 0 and R1
2 (0;1   ';0) > 0. This implies
that 1
2 (1;';1) = 0 and 1













H + 2(1   ')1


























Use equation (1) into (2) to obtain:
H1
1 = 'M   21
H, (3)







Plug (3) into @L
@R1
1(1) = 0 to ﬁnd that 1





















2(0;1 ';0) (we show in the proof of proposition 2 that this is true at the optimum),
1
1 (1) > 0 and R1
1 (1) = 0. Similarly, we can show that 1
1 (0) > 0, 1
2 (1;';') > 0, 1















> 0. This implies that R1
1 (0) = R1
1 (1) = R1
2 (1;';') = R1















= 0. The intuition for these results is that it is counterproductive to pay the
manager according to his trading decision only or according to the state of the world, when the latter
























21See that M  
K'
2' 1  0. We thus have 1
2 (1;';0) > 0, and R1
2 (1;';0) = 0: Using the same ap-
proach, it follows that R1













































The intuition for these results is that, for incentives reasons, the fund manager is not rewarded when
his trading decision is contradicted by the interim price or the ﬁnal cash-ﬂow.




































































































































































1 = 0;P1;P2;v = 0)

.
To complete the proof, one can check that , if one assumes initially that the optimal contract entails
R1
2 (1;P1;1) > 0 or R1
3 (1;P1;P2;1) > 0, and R1
2 (0;P1;0) > 0 or R1
3 (0;P1;P2;0) > 0, for all admissible
price paths (P1;P2), one obtains the same characterization for the optimal contract.
At the opposite, starting from R1
2 (1;P1;0) > 0 or R1
3 (1;P1;P2;0) > 0, and R1
2 (0;P1;1) > 0 or
22R1
3 (0;P1;P2;1) > 0, for all admissible price paths (P1;P2), leads to a contradiction.
Assume now that ' > . The program is very similar and is written:
min




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































: (:)  0:
The only diﬀerence with the previous program is that, when P1 = ' or P1 = 1   ', P2 = P1 with
probability 1. The resolution of the program is the same as before and yields the same characterization of
the optimal contract in terms of expected utility granted to the fund manager. As we show in proposition
2, what will diﬀer is the exact transfers.
Proof of corollary 1















































Proof of proposition 2











































































































































































































































































































































Multiply the (RHS) of (6) by
2'
2' 1 to show that (5) holds.
Proof of corollary 2
To prove this corollary, we analyze investor 1’s participation constraint. Recall that, with symmetric
information, long-term information is acquired if and only if ' > 'FB = 1
2 + 4E(R1
FB).
26Recall that the expected trading proﬁt is
2' 1

























The (RHS) of (7) is greater than 2
'U 1( c
3), which implies that: E(R1
') > E(R1
FB) and ' > 'FB.
Last, because E(R1
') < E(R1
'>), it follows immediately that ' > '.
Proof of proposition 3
Use the proof of proposition 1 to see that all transfers are null when the portfolio performance is null or











when ' > .
Proof of proposition 4





. The ratio of long term expected
bonus over total expected bonus is thus 2
3. Proceed in the same way to show that when ' > , the ratio
of long term expected bonus over total expected bonus is 4
5, which completes the proof.
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Figure 1: Timing of the models1=H
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Figure 2: Prices when managers exert effort and buy after good news only
The distribution of managers’ signals is computed as follows. When Manager 1 exerts effort,                                                   . 
Similarly,  . Notice that, when total demand qt=1, market makers learn nothing and Pt=Pt-1. When total demand 
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Panel A Panel B
Panel C Panel D
Figure3: Short-termism due to delegated portfolio management
This figure illustrates how short-termism arises in our model: the grey area is the region where long-term information is not acquired because of 
moral hazard. ϕ represents the precision of the portfolio manager’s information. The expected trading profit is the increasing blue line. Manager’s 
expected compensation is represented by a dotted red curve. The difference between expected compensation and the cost c of gathering information 
is due to informational rents. When ϕ is smaller than β, the interim price is very efficient due to informed trading and the incentive cost decreases. 
When ϕ is larger, there is less interim informed trading. If the manager is not too risk averse (see Panel A), the expected compensation curve is not 
altered. Otherwise, the cost of incentives increases (see Panel B), shifting upward the expected compensation curve. Short-termism increases with 
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